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Abstract 
 
We contribute to research on inequality and world top incomes by presenting the first 
calculations of Chilean top income shares and effective tax rates using individual tax-return 
microdata from 2005 and 2009.  We pay special attention to business income, which dominates 
at the top.  Our analysis includes not only distributed profits, but also the large proportion of 
accrued profits retained by firms, which are rarely analyzed given the difficulty of identifying 
individual owners.  Our most conservative top 1% income-share estimate is 15%—the fifth 
highest in the top incomes literature.  When distributed profits are adjusted for evasion, the top 
1% share reaches 22-26%.  When we broaden the income concept to include accrued profits, 
which we impute to taxpayers using ownership shares calculated from business tax forms, the 
top 1% share increases to a minimum of 23%.  Despite this impressive income concentration, the 
top 1% pays modest average effective income-tax rates of 15–16%.  	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1. Introduction 
Latin America has long been recognized as the region characterized by the world’s most 
extreme levels of inequality.  A growing body of research in economics and political science 
strives to understand the causes and consequences of inequality in Latin America, as well as 
prospects for redistribution and equitable development.1  However, most empirical research on 
inequality in Latin America draws on household surveys, which fail to capture information about 
the very rich.2  Atkinson and Piketty (2009, 2010) and their collaborators have demonstrated that 
income tax return data provide far more accurate information on top income shares, even where 
under-reporting is widespread.  To date, however, only a handful of developing countries have 
been analyzed in this literature, given the difficulty researchers have faced in obtaining access to 
detailed income-tax return data.3      
This paper contributes to research and public debate on inequality and redistribution and 
helps broaden the scope of developing countries analyzed in the top incomes literature by 
estimating Chilean income shares and effective tax rates from original new datasets compiled 
with the generous cooperation of Chile’s Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII).  Whereas most 
studies in the top incomes literature rely on tabulated tax-return data or samples of individual tax 
returns, we obtained access to the full universe of individual Chilean tax returns for 2005 and 
2009.4  We are therefore able to directly report income shares and effective tax rates for top-
income fractiles without recourse to fitting or extrapolation techniques.  Our analysis accordingly 
provides the most accurate description of top income shares, income compositions, and tax rates 
available for contemporary Chile, a country of special interest in Latin America given its 
reputation for successful poverty reduction, economic growth, and political stability that have 
nevertheless coexisted with high levels of inequality and popular disaffection.5  Using our two 
years of microdata in conjunction with the limited tabulated data published by the SII, we also 
estimate more approximate top shares for 2004–2011.   
A novel feature of this paper is our analysis of not only business profits that are formally 
distributed to individual taxpayers, but also the very large proportion of profits that are 
perpetually reinvested in Chilean firms.  We thus contribute to emerging research on income 
from wealth and capital—whether realized or not (Atkinson 2009b, Atkinson and Piketty 2010, 
Smeeding and Thompson 2010, Roine and Walderström 2012, Piketty and Zucman 2014).  
Capital income has long been recognized to augment inequality, but it is rarely analyzed given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Birdsall and Londoño (1997), World Bank (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), Goñi et al. (2011), Lustig et al. 
(2012), Haggard and Kaufman (2012), Huber and Stephens (2012), Schneider (2013), Fairfield (2015). 
2The rich tend to be underrepresented or absent from survey samples given their tiny numbers; sampling procedures 
are not designed to include them.  Moreover, they are more likely than average citizens to refuse to participate.  See 
Atkinson et al. (2010: 669), Korinek et al. (2006), Székeley and Hilgert (1999), Groves and Couper (1998). 
3A few Latin American countries make limited information available.  Argentina publishes statistics for the tiny 
minority (approximately 3%) of adults required to file income-tax declarations; the Chilean tax agency has also 
recently published some highly-aggregated income-tax return data.  Colombia is the only country that has provided 
extended panel microdata for analysis of inequality and tax incidence (Alvaredo and Londoño 2013); recent data 
(2009-11) is now available for Uruguay (Burdín et al. 2014).   
4By contrast, Chilean tax-agency data provided for Agostini et al.’s (2012) tax reform simulations aggregated 
taxpayers into brackets of 7,422 individuals, and the publicly available tax-agency statistics employed by Lopez et 
al. (2013) aggregate taxpayers into eight brackets defined by the marginal tax rate schedule; the top bracket contains 
13,000-24,000 taxpayers.    
5The 2011-2012 student demonstrations forced the issues of inequality and progressive taxation onto the national 
agenda; the Bachelet government (2014-) has proposed major reforms in response to their demands.   
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data limitations and the difficulty of accurately allocating unrealized income.6  We imputed 
accrued profits and accumulated retained profits to Chilean taxpayers using ownership shares 
calculated directly from businesses tax-return forms.  Several recent studies have also attempted 
to impute accrued profits to Chilean taxpayers, but they employ extremely limited information 
about ownership, and given their reliance on tabulated data, they are unable to rank taxpayers 
taking accrued profits into account.7  These problems are potentially serious; we find that there is 
significant re-ranking of taxpayers when comparing income definitions that include accrued 
profits rather than distributed profits; shares of income with accrued profits are substantially 
higher when taxpayers are ranked according to income including accrued profits as opposed to 
income including only distributed profits.   
Estimating the distribution of retained profits is particularly important in Chile because the 
country has a unique integrated income tax that creates strong incentives for business owners to 
avoid formally withdrawing profits.  Chile’s corporate tax serves as a withholding (an advance 
payment) against personal income taxes that owners are required to pay when they receive 
distributed profits.  Corporate taxes already collected at the firm level are credited against the 
recipient’s personal income taxes when dividends are distributed, so that profits are not double-
taxed.  However, distributed profits enter the personal income-tax base, and personal income is 
subject to progressive marginal tax rates reaching 40%.  Because the corporate tax (17% from 
2004-2010; currently 20%) is much lower than the top personal income-tax rate (40%), business 
owners leave the majority of their profits in the firm.  According to tax agency figures, on 
average, only one third of profits are distributed annually (Jorratt 2012: 42).  In addition, 
independent professionals commonly incorporate to avoid paying the much higher personal 
income tax rates.  Retained profits and incorporated income are not always channeled into 
productive investments.  Owners find both legal and illegal ways to consume profits without 
declaring dividends and hence without paying the corresponding individual income tax; for 
example, luxury vehicles for personal use may be registered to the firm (avoidance),8 or 
distributed profits may simply be omitted from tax declarations (evasion).  Income-tax evasion is 
estimated at 46%, essentially all of which is associated with distributed profits (Jorratt 2009: 7).  
It is difficult for the tax agency to detect and control under-declaration of distributed profits 
because the vast majority of Chilean businesses are organized as partnerships and close 
corporations, rather than publicly-traded corporations; the small number of publicly-traded 
corporations (amounting to only 0.05% of Chilean firms) are overseen by the Superintendencia 
de Valores y Seguros and are subject to independent auditing, which minimizes possibilities for 
evasion.  Given these considerations, ignoring retained profits in income distribution studies 
therefore significantly underestimates the vast material resources at the disposal of Chile’s 
economic elites.   
This paper further contributes to the small but growing literature analyzing not only top 
income shares, but also effective tax rates paid by the very rich (Piketty and Saez 2006, Bach et 
al. 2012, Alvaredo and Londoño 2013).  Such analysis can play an important role in informing 
policy debates and grounding scholarly analysis of redistributive politics and the ability of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Among other problems, many forms of capital income are tax-exempt and hence unreported.  On the serious nature 
of the problem of missing capital income and top income shares, see Aktinson, Piketty and Saez (2010).  
7López et al. (2013) use aggregate estimates of retained profits and assume based on extremely weak evidence that 
85% of retained profits accrue to taxpayers in the top 1%.  Agostini et al. (2012) estimate accured profits from 
household surveys.   
8Another frequent avoidance mechanism entails using capital gains to withdraw profits.  An owner can buy a 
property, sell it at a higher price to the business in which he or she owns shares, and pay no tax on the capital gain.  
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super-rich to defend their material interests.9  Moreover, we include the corporate tax in our 
estimates of effective tax rates.  The most widely referenced incidence study for Chile excludes 
profits retained by firms from the definition of individual income and ignores the corresponding 
corporate taxes because they are credited against future personal income tax payments (Engel et 
al. 1999: 159).  However, the corporate tax is not only an important source of revenue in Chile 
(43-50% of total income taxes in recent years10), it is in practice the only tax that many corporate 
profits ever pay, given widespread personal income tax avoidance and evasion (Cantallopts et al. 
2007).  Corporate taxation in Chile therefore can have important implications for both tax 
capacity and tax equity.  Agostini et al. (2013) embrace this view as well; they provide evidence 
that the tax deferral for capital income (i.e., profits do not enter the individual income-tax base 
until they are distributed) creates significant horizontal inequity and reduces the progressivity of 
the income tax system.  However, their analysis is limited by lack of access to the business tax-
return forms that we obtained in order to estimate ownership shares. 
We find that the concentration of income and profits in Chile is among the highest 
currently estimated in the top incomes literature, although uncertainty associated with the 
distribution of undeclared distributed profits and the lack of comparable studies analyzing 
accrued profits prevent us from confidently ranking Chile among the other income-inequality 
leaders (the US, Argentina, Colombia and South Africa).  When only distributed profits are 
included in the income definition, we conservatively estimate that the top 1% of adults receives 
an income share of 15% while the top 0.01% receives 1%.  These shares increase substantially 
when we adjust distributed profits for under-declaration.  Depending on the assumptions 
employed to impute undeclared profits, estimated shares for 2005 and 2009 range from 22-26% 
for the top 1%, and 1.6-7.4% for the top 0.01%.  When the income definition includes accrued 
profits instead of distributed profits, top 1% shares range from 23-26% (unadjusted) to 32-33% 
(adjusted for under-reporting), while top 0.01% shares rise to between 5-7% (unadjusted) and 9-
11% (adjusted for under-reporting).  Despite this impressive concentration of income, effective 
income tax rates paid by the richest Chileans are modest.  The top 1% pays an average effective 
rate of at most 15-16%.  Our estimated average effective tax rates including the corporate tax in 
the numerator and accrued profits in the denominator are also 15% for the top 1%; the effective 
rate for the US including corporate tax is 24% (Piketty and Saez 2006).   
 
I. Data and Methods 
Whereas multiple previous requests had been denied, in May 2011 Chile’s tax agency (SII) 
graciously agreed to provide us with access to confidential, anonymized individual tax return 
records from 2005 and 2009 within the tax agency’s premises.  Compiling our datasets required 
detailed knowledge about the tax agency’s information systems and filing forms and extensive 
work on the tax agency’s computers, as well as a lengthy process for obtaining authorization for 
the project.   
By Latin American standards, our datasets are remarkably comprehensive in terms of the 
number of individuals they include.  Income taxes in Latin America generally exclude the 
majority of the population; most adults make less than the minimum taxable income given high 
levels of poverty and inequality.  In Chile, approximately 82% of individuals earn less than the 
taxable threshold (Agostini et al. 2012).  Nevertheless, individuals registered with the SII 
comprised 63% (67%) of adults in 2005 (2009) (many of whom did not receive enough income 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9Hacker and Pierson (2010), Winters (2011), Fairfield (2015). 
10SII, Serie Ingresos Tributarios Consolidados, 2009-2011, Santiago, Chile.  
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to owe taxes).  Our datasets contain information on all reported income and taxes paid by these 
individuals.  This section describes the key components of our datasets and the methods used to 
compile them. 
 
a) Income and profits 
Our datasets record income in 8 categories: pensions (aggregated private and public), 
wages, independent work, rent from real estate, interest earnings, taxable capital gains, dividends 
and distributed profits, and accrued net business profits.11  Information on the first seven 
categories comes directly from forms filed by taxpayers, crosschecked against forms filed by 
withholding or reporting agents whenever possible.  To reconstruct total, pre-tax wage income, 
deductions for mandatory health insurance payments and contributions to private pension funds 
were added back to the declared taxable amounts.  We exclude the many untaxed forms of 
interest, capital gains, and rent from our analysis for lack of adequate information, as is the norm 
in the top incomes literature.12      
Accrued profits—a unique feature of our datasets—were allocated using ownership shares 
calculated from business tax forms: the ratio of profits distributed to a particular owner to total 
profits distributed by the firm.  After multiple iterations to trace through interlocking business 
ownership, 49% (45%) of the total accrued profits for 2005 (2009) were imputed to Chilean 
taxpayers, 31% (37%) to foreign owners, and 3% (2%) to funds managed by pension and mutual 
administrators.  Profits imputed to foreigners are omitted from our dataset; profits accrued to 
pension funds were imputed in proportion to taxpayers’ pension and wage income (see Appendix 
1). We lack ownership information to impute the remaining 17% (16%) of profits reported to the 
tax agency in 2005 (2009). We employ three alternative approaches for handling these residual 
profits.  The first is to simply omit them.  The second entails imputing these residual profits 
based on the distribution of the accrued profits for which we do have ownership information.  
The third imputes the residual accrued profits in proportion to the distribution of taxpayers’ 
declared distributed profits.  While all of these approaches are ad hoc, they provide a rough 
estimate of the uncertainty surrounding the distribution of accrued profits.          
Our datasets also include retained profits accumulated since 1984, as reported in 
businesses’ “Taxable Profit Fund” (Fondo de Utilidades Tributables, FUT) ledgers. These 
retained profits were imputed to individual taxpayers using the same ownership shares calculated 
as described above.  The tax agency uses the FUT, which was created in 1984 when the Pinochet 
dictatorship established Chile’s integrated income tax system, to keep track of how much tax 
credit (corporate tax paid by the firm) owners are due when they eventually withdraw these 
profits and pay individual income taxes.  Total FUT profits reported at the end of 2012 were 
equivalent to Chile’s GDP.  FUT funds imputed to taxpayers in our datasets make up 56-61% of 
the total.    
 
b) Adjusting for undeclared income    
In addition to estimating top income shares using declared income in the categories 
described above, which is the norm in the top incomes literature, we estimate shares after 
adjusting income in three categories to the Chilean Central Bank’s national accounting figures: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Appendix 1 describes the interest earnings, capital gains, and accrued profits categories in more detail.  
12Despite the difficulties that relying on income definitions dictated by country-specific tax systems creates for 
cross-national comparisons, this approach appears inevitable for analyses employing tax-agency data, and the 
associated problems are generally sidestepped in the literature.  
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independent work, distributed profits, and accrued profits.  This section describes our rationale 
for adjusting these incomes and the procedures employed to impute undeclared income.  
Appendix 2 provides additional methodological details.  
The first two types of income—independent work and distributed profits—are subject to 
significant under-reporting.  Most independent professionals opt to declare expenses under a 
simplified presumptive regime, which in practice probably inflates expenses and thereby reduces 
declared income.  Regarding distributed profits, as previously discussed, the tax system creates 
strong incentives for under-declaration and provides many loopholes to access retained profits 
for consumption, and it is difficult for the tax agency to obtain information from impartial third 
parties that would help detect inconsistencies on tax declarations.13  Independent work income 
calculated from national accounts was 1.3 (1.5) times higher than the total declared to the tax 
agency in 2005 (2009).  The discrepancy for distributed profits was far greater—the national 
accounts figure was 2.8 (3.2) times greater than the tax agency figure.  We believe that this very 
large gap is explained primarily by evasion.  The national accounts value, which is a residual 
calculated from changes in assets based on information provided by financial institutions, is 
accepted by Chilean experts as a good approximation of the profits actually distributed to 
households.  The other components of household income in the national accounts come from 
reliable sources and should be free of significant measurement error, so the accounting 
discrepancy that would otherwise arise must reflect unreported distributed profits.       
 Total accrued profits constructed from national accounts surpassed the tax agency total by 
a lesser but still substantial factor of 1.9 (2.2).  This discrepancy is likely explained by a 
combination of under-declaration, tax benefits that cannot be estimated which should be added 
back to declared taxable profits (e.g. asset depreciation), and the inherent difficulties of 
constructing a matching definition of accrued profits from national accounts, which are derived 
from different data to serve different purposes.  Despite the latter issue, we think it best to adjust 
the imputed accrued profits to national accounts, given the known sources of downward bias that 
affect our raw estimates.    
Independent work.  To adjust independent work income in our datasets, we first use 
Chilean household surveys (CASEN) to estimate the portion of the national accounts figure that 
accrues to individuals who did not file tax returns.  We then impute the difference between this 
amount and the tax agency total to taxpayers in proportion to their declared independent work 
income.  In other words, we assume that the distribution of undeclared independent work income 
is identical to the distribution of declared independent work income.  	  
Distributed profits.  To adjust distributed profits, we impute the full difference between the 
national accounts value and the tax agency value to tax filers.  We thus assume that non-filers 
receive negligible capital income,14 which we believe is appropriate for Chile given the relatively 
large percentage of adults registered with the tax agency and the evident concentration of capital 
income in tax agency data; household surveys also suggest that capital income is extremely 
concentrated (Cantellopts et al. 2007).  We employ three alternative methods for imputing 
undeclared profits.  The first method entails allocating the difference between the national 
accounts total and the tax agency total in proportion to taxpayers’ declared distributed profits.  
This approach likely overestimates evasion among taxpayers who declared substantial distributed 
profits and underestimates evasion among taxpayers with large accrued profits who declared 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Tax agency access to bank information on checking accounts, which would help detect undeclared business 
income and independent work income, is highly restricted and cannot be used for general auditing operations.    
14Alvaredo and Saez (2010) make the same assumption for Spain. 
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minimal distributed profits.  Our second method makes the alternative assumption that evasion is 
proportional to the difference between taxpayers’ accrued profits and the distributed profits that 
they declare.  In other words, we assume that an individual with large accrued profits who 
declared few distributed profits has engaged in substantial evasion (rather than actually 
reinvesting profits in the firm).  This approach alters the distribution of distributed profits to 
more closely reflect the distribution of imputed accrued profits.  The third approach imputes 
undeclared profits in proportion to the distribution of retained profits accumulated in the FUT 
ledger.  The assumption here is that the larger the taxpayer’s FUT account, the fewer distributed 
profits the taxpayer has truthfully declared.  This approach attempts to capture the view shared 
by many experts that the FUT serves more to facilitate tax evasion than to stimulate productive 
investment.  Of course, none of these approaches is likely to give an accurate depiction of the 
actual distribution of undeclared profits, which is by definition unknown.  Together with the 
unadjusted data, however, they serve to delineate the range of uncertainty.  
Accrued profits.  For accrued profits, we assign the difference between national accounts 
and tax agency totals in proportion to the positive net accrued profits in our datasets.  This 
procedure is likely to overestimate earnings for taxpayers at the top of the accrued-profits 
ranking, since taxpayers with large net accrued losses do not receive any positive adjustment, 
even though they too may have either under-declared gains or over-declared losses.  We also 
employ an alternative approach that uses the distribution of gross earnings as the basis for the 
adjustment.  This approach has the advantage that accrued net losses also receive a positive 
adjustment, which is desirable because our estimates of accrued profits do not correct for tax 
benefits associated with depreciation; depreciation may account for some of the large net 
negative values in our datasets.    
 
c) Income definitions for analyzing top shares 
We analyze top income shares using several different income definitions.  We begin with a 
definition based on taxable income that corresponds to earnings realized during the year.  This 
income, denoted Y_Rlzd, includes pensions, wages, independent work, taxable interest, and 
distributed profits.15    
We next construct an income Y_AcrdProf that substitutes imputed accrued profits for 
distributed profits.  The logic is to more closely approximate a Haig-Simons income concept—
consumption plus changes in net worth—which aims to measure individuals’ potential to 
consume without reducing their wealth during the period in question.16  This approach is 
arguably preferable for characterizing material resources at the top when realized capital income 
is small compared to unrealized capital income (Smeeding and Thompson 2010).17  Our Y_AcrdProf 
income definition is particularly appropriate for Chile, given the tendency to under-declare or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15We would like to exclude public pensions, following top incomes studies that focus on market income, but tax 
agency figures mix public and private pension payments, and we do not have enough information to disaggregate 
the two.  However, Chile’s pension system was privatized in 1980, and the residual public system accounted for 
only 35% of pension payments in 2009.  This figure excludes public pension top-ups that are paid to low-income 
Chileans and financed by tax revenue.  Recipients of these public-supported pensions do not earn enough to pay 
income taxes.   
16See Haig (1921), Simons (1938).  
17Our income Y2 is similar to Smeeding and Thompson’s (2010) “More Complete Income,” which includes imputed 
capital income.  The authors substitute imputed capital income for reported interest, rents, and dividends to better 
approximate changes in net worth.  For Chile, we lack sufficient information on real estate assets to be able to treat 
this income source similarly to retained profits.   
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disguise distributed profits, as well as the fact that few capital gains are taxed.  As Atkinson, 
Piketty and Saez (2010: 677) observe: “When realized capital gains are untaxed and hence not 
observed, it is important to assess the effects of attributing retained profits to top income.”  
We estimate top shares using various related income definitions that either include or 
exclude capital gains, alter the treatment of pensions, apply alternative adjustment procedures, or 
do not adjust independent work or profits to national accounts at all.  Our preferred definition of 
income Y_AcrdProf excludes capital gains (which are primarily received by businesses), because 
they may reflect profits generated in previous years rather than income generated during the year 
in question, and because including imputed capital gains along with accrued profits may result in 
some double-counting.  In addition, since we are particularly interested in examining how top 
income shares change when examining accrued profits rather than distributed profits, we prefer 
to leave other components in the income definition unaltered compared to Y_Rlzd.   
 
Core income definitions:    
Y_Rlzd  = pensions + wages + independent work + taxable net interest + taxable rent + distributed 
profits; declared incomes only     
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc = Y_Rlzd but adjusting independent work and distributed profits to National 
Accounts  
Y_AcrdProf = pensions + wages + independent work + taxable net interest + taxable rent + 
imputed accrued profits; declared incomes and accrued profits for which ownership 
information exists only   
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc = Y_AcrdProf but adjusting independent work and accrued profits to 
National Accounts     
Auxiliary definitions: 
Y_Rlzd _CG = Y_Rlzd + capital gains received by individuals 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt1 = Y_Rlzd_NatAcc but using the alternative distributed-profits adjustment 
method based on the difference between taxpayers’ positive accrued profits and 
distributed profits   
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt2 = Y_Rlzd_NatAcc but using the distribution of accumulated retained profits 
in the FUT to adjust dividends      
Y´_AcrdProf = Y_AcrdProf + declared accrued profits in firms without ownership information 
imputed in proportion to declared distributed profits 
Y´´_AcrdProf = Y_AcrdProf + declared accrued profits in firms without ownership information 
imputed in proportion to the distribution of accrued profits for which ownership 
information exists 
Y_AcrdProf _CG = Y_AcrdProf including capital gains     
Y_AcrdProf_Pens  = Y_AcrdProf with imputed accrued profits from pension funds instead of 
pension payments 
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc _alt = Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc but using the distribution of gross income to 
adjust accrued profits     
 
d) Ranking taxpayers 
Our work with the tax agency micro-data produced six datasets based on rankings of 
individual taxpayers that correspond to each of the four core income definitions listed above, as 
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well as two alternative adjustment procedures (Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt2, Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc _alt).  After ranking 
individuals according to each income definition, the data was aggregated into groups consisting 
of eleven taxpayers each (rows in our datasets), following the tax agency’s protocol for 
protecting taxpayer confidentiality.  When analyzing the additional auxiliary income definitions 
listed above, we employ the dataset with the ranking that is most closely correlated with the 
definition in question.  
 
e) Control incomes  
We estimate control incomes (the denominator for calculating income shares) by 
combining tax agency data with national accounts, as is standard in the top incomes literature 
when sizable portions of the adult population do not file tax returns.  We construct total amounts 
of wage income, independent work, distributed profits, and accrued profits from national 
accounts.  To these amounts we add total tax agency figures for taxable rent and interest, for 
which comparable figures could not be constructed from national accounts.  This procedure 
produces control incomes corresponding to Y_Rlzd_NatAcc (adjusted distributed profits and other 
realized income) of approximately 60% GDP, the same value used for Argentina (Alvaredo 
2010).  This value is also similar to control incomes for other countries analyzed in the Atkinson 
and Piketty (2009, 2010) top incomes volumes.  When we replace distributed profits with 
imputed accrued profits (Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc), our control income increases to 66-67% GDP.   
For the income definitions including unadjusted declared profits (Y_Rlzd, Y_AcrdProf, 
Y´_AcrdProf, Y´´_AcrdProf), we use the total value of declared profits from the tax agency datasets in 
the control income instead of the national accounts figures, in accord with our assumption that 
capital income accrues only to tax filers.18  These control incomes are substantially smaller 
(which is not surprising given the large discrepancy between capital income reported to the tax 
agency and capital income calculated from national accounts) (Table 1).   
 
––Table 1 here–– 
 
f) Control populations     
Income taxes in Chile are filed individually.  There is no option for married couples to file 
jointly, and they receive no preferential tax treatments.  For the control population, we therefore 
use estimates of the adult population over age 20, following the usual approach in the top 
incomes literature. 
 
––Table 2 here–– 
 
It should be noted that using households as the unit of analysis would result in lower top 
income shares, considering that female labor participation is relatively low in Chile.19  Sanhueza 
and Mayer (2011: 179-80) illustrate this phenomenon for the top decile and top centile using 
household survey data; however, they find that differences between shares constructed using 
household income, per capita household income, and individual income are small. Analyzing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18We likewise exclude from the control income the amount of independent work income that we estimate is evaded 
by tax filers.  Including this amount lowers top share estimates only slightly.   
19Female labor force participation has been rising over the past decade; Chile’s rate in 2005 was only 43.4% 
compared to the OECD average of 61.9%, but it reached 53.6% in 2010 compared to 63.9% for the OECD 
(http://stats.oecd.org).   
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gender inequality with tax return data is an interesting potential avenue for future research if the 
tax agency is able to supply such information.20   
 
 
II. Results: Top Incomes  
 
a) Realized income shares 
We begin our analysis with the standard realized income definition, (Y_Rlzd, Table 3).  Top 
shares are significantly smaller when distributed profits are not adjusted to national accounts 
compared to scenarios that do adjust profits for under-reporting.  For the top 1%, we estimate 
unadjusted shares of 15-15.5%, whereas evasion-adjusted shares range from 21.6-26.2%.  We 
view the unadjusted shares as lower limits.  The adjusted shares are of course educated guesses 
given that the actual distribution of undeclared profits is unobservable.  However, we believe that 
the upward effect on top income shares is accurate.    
Our estimated income shares for the top 10%, 1% and 0.1% do not vary significantly from 
2005 to 2009.  Shares at the very top show more variation.  For the top 0.0001%, Y_Rlzd 
(unadjusted) and Y_Rlzd_NatAcc (adjusted) shares are about half as large in 2009, a recessionary 
year, whereas Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt1(2) shares are 1.8 (1.3) times larger in 2009.   
Figure 1 shows Lorenz curves (cumulative income distributions) for the top 10% and top 
1% in 2005, plotted directly from our datasets.  As expected, the data are closely approximated 
by Pareto distributions; the estimated Pareto shape parameter is 2.37 (2.46) for the top 1% of the 
unadjusted 2005 (2009) Y_Rlzd curve.   
 
––Table 3 here–– 
 
––Figure 1 here–– 
 
 
b) Shares with imputed accrued profits 
Top income shares including accrued profits instead of distributed profits (Y_AcrdProf, Table 
4, Figure 2) are significantly larger, indicating the very high concentration of capital ownership 
in Chile.  Estimates for the top 1% share start from a minimum of 23% when no adjustments are 
made to the tax agency data (Y_AcrdProf).  These findings agree with other studies that report more 
significant inequality when working with income concepts that include broader sources of 
realized and/or unrealized capital income (Smeeding and Thompson 2010, Atkinson and Piketty 
2010, Roine and Waldenström 2012).   
 
––Table 4 here–– 
 
––Figure 2 here–– 
 
To further assess the importance of accrued profits at the top, following Roine and 
Waldenström’s (2012) approach for capital gains, we calculate shares with accrued profits using 
two different rankings: one including only distributed profits, and one including accrued profits 
instead.  We then compare to shares including distributed profits only (Table 5).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. See Sanhueza and Mayer (2001: 183) for analysis using 
household surveys and Carrillo et al. (2013) on the gender wage gap.  
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The results indicate that retained profits are an important resource for those who are 
already at the top of the realized income distribution (Y_Rlzd), and including accrued profits in the 
income concept significantly augments inequality.  Shares increase substantially when accrued 
profits are substituted for distributed profits without altering the original ranking of taxpayers. 
Shares with accrued profits increase further when taxpayers are re-ranked according this income 
concept.  Ratios of shares with accrued profits to those with distributed profits, ranking taxpayers 
according to the respective income definitions, range from 1.47-1.53.  These ratios are similar to 
ratios of top 1% shares with capital gains to those without in Sweden (Roine and Waldenström 
2012).      
 
––Table 5 here–– 
 
These results also indicate that rankings corresponding to the two different income 
concepts differ nontrivially.  Indeed, there are taxpayers in our datasets who declare relatively 
low distributed profits even though their accrued profits are quite large, and taxpayers who 
receive substantial distributed profits even though their net accrued profits for the year are 
negative.21   
Another way to assess the differences in these two rankings entails identifying the percent 
of taxpayers in a given top Y_Rlzd fractile who also fall within the same fractile of the Y_AcrdProf 
distribution (Table 6).  Continuity across the top 1% is quite high—nearly 78%, whereas much 
smaller percentages of taxpayers in the top 0.01% and top 0.001% were also at the top of the 
Y_AcrdProf  distribution.   
 
––Table 6 here–– 
  
 
c) Estimated top shares from published tabulated data (2004–2012) 
We hope to build a more extended time series from tax-return microdata in the future.  In 
the meantime, we provide rough estimates of top income shares from published tabulated data 
(reported income with distributed profits, available only for the years 2004–2012) by applying 
fixed adjustments based on comparisons with our much more accurate 2005 and 2009 estimates 
(Table 7).22  We first estimate shares directly from the tabulated data for 2005 and 2009, 
substituting the total amount of reported income from the tabulated data for the total reported 
income in our more detailed datasets.  Total income in the tabulated data is less than the total 
income in our datasets, partly due to accounting differences in the way the tax agency reports the 
data.  We apply standard Pareto interpolation procedures used in the top income literature to 
estimate income shares for the top 1%, 0.1%, and 0.01% from the tabulated data.23  These shares 
agree well with our Y_Rlzd shares for 2005 and 2009 (1–5% relative difference).  We then 
calculate adjustment factors in order to estimate shares of different income concepts from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21The mismatch between distributed and accrued profits in these latter cases may occur for several reasons.  First, 
businesses may distribute profits accrued during a previous year even if they registered losses in the current year.  
Second, an individual may hold ownership in multiple businesses, some of which distribute profits but some of 
which accrue large losses that overwhelmed profits accrued in the other firms.  Third, some of the mismatch 
between distributed and accrued profits may be an artifact of our imperfect reconstruction of accrued profits from 
taxable profits, due to the difficulties of estimating tax allowances for depreciation.  
22We thank Emanuel Saez for this suggestion.  
23See Freenberg and Poturba (1992), Piketty and Saez (2003), and Alvaredo (2007). 
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tabulated data (Table 8).  Adjustment factors for Y_Rlzd_NatAcc top shares are quite stable for each 
of the three top fractiles across the two years for which we have tax-return microdata (1–3% 
relative difference).  Adjustment factors for Y_AcrdProf and Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc are also reasonably 
stable for the top 0.1% and 1% (2–5% and 6–10% relative difference respectively).  We proceed 
to multiply top fractile shares estimated from the tabulated data for the other years by the 
geometric mean of our 2005 and 2009 adjustment factors.   
For the Y_AcrdProf (_NatAcc) top 0.01%, we report shares with two significant figures only.  
Given the more substantial relative variation between the 2005 and 2009 adjustment factors, 
applying a constant adjustment factor across the full time series likely produces more error, so 
these shares should be treated as rougher approximations.    
Top income shares are fairly constant from 2004–2011, except for anomalously high 2008 
values.  The published tax agency data for this year reports an unusually high mean income for 
taxpayers in the top bracket; access to microdata will be necessary for analyzing why this year 
appears out of line with the others.  
 
 ––Table 7 here––  
 
––Table 8 here–– 	  
d) International comparisons  
Figure 3 places Chile’s standard top income shares (Y_Rlzd) in cross-national context.  We 
plot the Chilean estimates from tabulated data along with our microdata estimates, with and 
without adjusting for under-declaration.  When examining Figure 3, it is important to recognize 
that income definitions depend on tax systems and therefore vary in potentially non-trivial ways; 
methodological differences in how control incomes are calculated across countries may affect 
results as well.24  At present, these difficulties remain unresolved in the top incomes literature.  
Bearing these caveats in mind, we discuss some tentative comparative conclusions.         
When profits are not adjusted to national accounts, Chile’s top 1% shares are higher than 
most European countries but lower than the four inequality leaders in the World Top Incomes 
Database (Colombia, Argentina, the U.S., South Africa) (Figure 3.a).  However, we think it is 
more appropriate to use Chile’s adjusted shares in cross-national comparisons.  Although 
adjusting to national accounts is not standard in the top incomes literature, Chile’s tax system 
creates strong incentives to under-declare distributed profits, and Chile’s tax agency has weak 
capacity for detecting undeclared distributed profits.  Similar incentives do not exist in Argentina 
or Colombia, where the top personal income tax rate matches the corporate tax rate and 
dividends do not enter the personal income tax base.25  While Nordic countries have similar gaps 
between tax rates on personal (wage) income and capital income, avoidance (income shifting) 
may be more salient than evasion (undeclared income).26  Roine and Waldenström (2008: 375) 
estimate that correcting for evasion in Sweden causes top 1% shares to rise by at most 25%.  For 
Chile, top 1% shares increase by 40-44% in the most conservative adjustment scenario 
(Y_Rlzd_NatAcc); higher fractiles increase by far more.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24For more on these issues, see Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2010).   
25In Argentina, taxpayers have incentives to over-declare capital income in order to justify changes in patrimony that 
might otherwise alert officials to investigate for potential evasion or money laundering (AFIP 2008, interview).     
26Note however that Engstrom and Holmlund (2009: 2426) estimate for Sweden that “self-employed households 
with unincorporated businesses hide around 50% of their true incomes.”  On income shifting in Finland, which is a 
particular concern among small firms, see Pirttila and Selin (2011). 
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When profits are adjusted to national accounts, Chile’s top 1% share surpasses all other 
countries in the World Top Incomes Database.  Evasion-adjusted top 1% shares for Argentina 
(Alvaredo 2007) reach similarly high levels.27  Shares with adjusted profits for Chile’s top 0.1% 
and higher fractiles are sensitive to the method used for imputing undeclared dividends.  
Adjusted top 0.01% Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt1(2) shares exceed those in all other countries analyzed (Figure 
3.b).  Chile’s adjusted Y_Rlzd_NatAcc shares are substantially lower but similar to South Africa.  
Unadjusted Chilean shares are closer to European shares.           
 
––Figure 3 here–– 
 
Turning to our more complete income definition (Y_AcrdProf), cross-national comparisons 
become more difficult since the distribution of accrued profits has rarely been analyzed.28  We 
tentatively compare Chilean income shares with accrued profits to income shares including 
capital gains in other countries (Figure 4), assuming for these other countries as Piketty and Saez 
(2006: 9) do for the U.S. that “…realized capital gains on corporate stock reported on individual 
tax returns are of comparable magnitude to retained earnings from corporations estimated in 
National Accounts.”  Chile’s top 1% shares with accrued profits exceed U.S. shares with capital 
gains.  Chile’s unadjusted top 0.01% shares are similar to U.S. shares, whereas adjusted top 
0.01% shares are significantly higher.   
 
––Figure 4 here–– 
 
 
e) Mobility at the top  
Our data suggests that mobility in Chile among top income fractiles (Table 9) is similar 
to developed countries.  After four years, 60% of taxpayers who were in the top 1% in 2005 
remained within that fractile (64% if taxpayers who no longer existed in 2009 are eliminated 
from the initial group).29  For the US and Germany, studies have found that the probability of 
remaining in the top 1% after 3-5 years is 60-68% (Kopczuk et al. 2010: 114, Jenderny 2013: 
13).  For the top 0.1% in Chile, we find that 43% remained in that fractile four years later; 
similarly, the probability of remaining in the top 0.1% in Canada is 40-50% (Saez and Veall 
2007: 250).   
Mobility among fractiles based on accrued profits (Table 10) is slightly lower for all but 
the top 0.001% of Chileans.  40% of taxpayers remained in the top 0.001% Y_AcrdProf  fractile 
after four years, compared to 32% for the Y_Rlzd fractile. 
  
––Table 9 here–– 
 
––Table 10 here–– 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27Alvaredo’s methodology for adjusting incomes differs from ours.  He views these shares as upper limits that likely 
overestimate evasion among the very rich.  
28Atkinson (2009b: 99-100) analyzes how retained profits affect top income shares in the UK during the inter-war 
period, drawing on limited data available on personally-owned shares.   
29These figures are based on analysis of individual-level data carried out within the tax agency.   
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f) Heavy concentration of accumulated retained profits  
Our datasets allow us to examine not only the distribution of profits accrued during the 
year in question, but also the distribution of retained profits accumulated in the FUT since 1984.  
These retained profits represent a significant source of wealth in Chile—at least on paper (the 
FUT is an accounting mechanisms, and many of these profits in practice have probably been 
withdrawn)—and they are heavily concentrated (Table 11).  Depending on the income definition 
used to rank taxpayers and the year, the top 0.1% owns 36-78% of retained profits.  As such, 
accumulated retained profits are significantly more concentrated than yearly (declared) 
distributed and accrued profits.30     
Additionally, our data show that FUT wealth is only loosely correlated with reported 
income Y_Rlzd.  The correlation with reported Y_AcrdProf income is much stronger.     
 
––Table 11 here–– 
 
g) Income composition: Importance of profits at the very top 
We focus our analysis of top income compositions on income definitions Y_Rlzd and 
Y_AcrdProf, without any adjustments for under-reported profits or independent work.  Figure 5 
shows the share of each income type for the top percentiles.  For Y_Rlzd, distributed profits 
dominate other income sources only for the top 0.001%; wages dominate for lower percentiles 
within the top 1%.  The Y_Rlzd figure also displays the ratio of declared distributed profits to 
accrued profits.  These ratios vary widely, from a minimum of 12% to a maximum of 75%, with 
no consistent pattern over time or across percentiles.  For Y_AcrdProf, accrued profits dominate 
within the top 0.1%, constituting over 84% of total income in that fractile; less than 13% of 
accrued profits are distributed.  Compared to Y_AcrdProf, Y_Rlzd income compositions are much 
more variable over time, even though shares of each source in aggregate personal income change 
only marginally.  Declared distributed profits make up a much lower share of the two top 
percentile incomes in 2009 (44% and 32% respectively) compared to 2005 (87% and 46% 
respectively).  For comparison, the figures also display capital gains as a percent of total income, 
even though they are not included in the income definition.  For the most part, capital gains are 
negligible compared to other income sources.     
––Figure 5 here–– 
 
To get a sense of how individuals in the top 1% can be characterized in terms of their 
income sources, we rank our rows of 11 aggregated taxpayers by their share of specific income 
types (wages and pensions, independent work, profits31).  This procedure follows Bach et al. 
(2009: 321), except that we are not able to rank at the individual level.  However, each row for 
this purpose can be considered a “typical” taxpayer in the corresponding cohort.  Table 12 shows 
that most of those in the top 1% receive income from a mix of sources.  For Y_Rlzd, 
approximately 9% (16%) receive over 80% of their income from wages in 2005 (2009); 0% 
report distributed profits in excess of 80% of total income.  Independent work plays a much less 
significant role compared to wages and profits; 98% (99%) of typical taxpayers receive under 
30% of their income from this source.  For Y_AcrdProf, the fraction of wage-earners (over 80% of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30The top 0.1% recives 17-66% of accrued profits and 12-23% of distributed profits.  
31Income shares from interest and rent are small.  
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income from wages and pensions) in the top 1% drops to 5% (10%), while the fraction of 
business people (over 80% from accrued profits) increases to 3%.   
When we examine the top 0.01% alone, business activity grows in importance relative to 
wage income for 2006.  1% of these typical taxpayers report distributed profits surpassing 80% 
of total Y_Rlzd income compared to just 3% in the wage-earners category.  The figures are more 
dramatic for Y_AcrdProf incomes.  Accrued profits exceed 80% of total income for 66% (61%) of 
typical taxpayers in 2005 (2009), whereas none have wage-income shares over 30%.  
Accordingly, when we focus on accrued profits rather than distributed profits, the top of the 
distribution is clearly and consistently dominated by business owners.   
The same phenomenon is apparent within the top 0.001% as well; the top of the Y_Rlzd 
distribution is dominated by wage earners, whereas as the top of the Y_AcrdProf  distribution is 
dominated by business owners.  All typical taxpayers in the Y_AcrdProf  top 0.001% have accrued 
profits exceeding 98% of total income.  In stark contrast, all typical taxpayers in the Y_Rlzd top 
0.001% have wage income shares above 96%.  These results further indicate the importance of 
analyzing accrued profits.   
 
––Table 12 here–– 
 
 
III. Effective Tax Rates  
a) Tax data 
Our datasets contain information on both individual and corporate income taxes.  Chile’s 
individual income tax is divided into two categories.  People who earn only wage income pay the 
“second category tax” (ISC, impuesto de segunda catagoría) with progressive marginal rates 
rising from 5% to 40% (Table 13).32  People who receive any other sources of income instead of 
or in addition to wages pay the “complementary global tax” (IGC, impuesto global 
complementario), which applies the same progressive rate schedule to the sum total of taxable 
income.33  The corporate income tax on accrued profits (IPC, impuesto de primera categoría) 
was imputed to individuals using the same iterative assignment procedure employed to allocate 
accrued profits (Section I.a).  We imputed the small amount of corporate tax corresponding to 
accrued profits in pension funds (approximately 5% of the total) in proportion to taxpayers’ work 
and pension income,34 a similar procedure to that employed by Piketty and Saez (2006) for the 
US.     
 
––Table 13 here–– 
 
Amounts registered for the corporate tax and the IGC may be negative, indicating that the 
tax agency has reimbursed the taxpayer.  Loss carry-back is the most common scenario leading 
to negative corporate taxes.  In general, the total annual amount of IGC paid tends to be negative, 
primarily because the credit for the corporate tax paid by companies when profits accrue tends to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32Marginal rates were lowered in 2012 to the following schedule: 4%, 8%, 13.5%, 23%, 30.4%, 35.5%, 40%.  
33Capital gains are an exception: they are subject to corporate tax but do not enter into the IGC base and hence 
receive preferential tax treatment.  
34We estimated corporate tax from pension funds by applying an effective rate (16.8%) calculated from aggregate 
figures to accrued profits in these funds.  We do not take independent work into account when imputing corporate 
tax from pensions funds since the bulk of pension contributions were made by dependent workers.        
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exceed the income tax that individuals owe on their distributed profits.  However, at the very top 
of the income distribution, IGC amounts are primarily positive.    
 
b) Effective rates ignoring corporate tax   
Table 14 displays effective tax rates defined as individual income taxes paid divided by 
declared realized income (Y_Rlzd).  We exclude corporate taxes on retained profits, as is most 
common in incidence studies.  However, we do include corporate taxes corresponding to 
distributed profits—recall that Chile’s corporate tax is credited against individual income taxes 
owed when profits are distributed.  Effective tax rates calculated including capital gains and 
capital gains taxes differ only marginally from the rates in Table 14, except for the top 0.001% in 
2009 (the effective rate drops by 1.7 percentage points when capital gains are included).     
Rates do not vary much from 2005 to 2009, with the exception of the top 0.0001%, which 
paid only 15% in 2005 compared to 31% in 2009.  The 2005 rate results from the unusually low 
tax on distributed profits collected from the owners’ businesses (corporate tax credit).35   
Effective tax rates vary substantially within the percentiles reported in Table 14.  Over an 
interval of 0.01% around the top 99.9%, the coefficient of variation is 12%.  Tax benefits to 
promote savings are one salient source of horizontal inequity that may help to explain the spread.      
Table 14.a includes effective individual income tax rates for the U.S., Germany, Colombia, 
and Uruguay, the only countries to our knowledge for which similar analyses exist.  However, 
much caution is required when making cross-country comparisons.  Given the problem of 
undeclared dividends, the Chilean rates are upper bounds; concluding that rates at the top are 
similar in Chile and the two OECD countries would be misguided.  Rates at the top are lower 
and flatter when distributed profits are adjusted to national accounts (Table 14.b).  When 
comparing Chilean and Colombian rates, it is important to note that the strikingly low 
Colombian rates are sensitive to Alvaredo and Londoño’s (2013: 22) assumption that 33% of 
income reported as “ingresos no constitutivos de renta” are dividends taxed at the firm level.36  
They estimate that if dividends instead comprise 75% of income in this category, the average 
effective tax rate for the top 0.01% would rise to 14%.  That rate is closer to Chilean rates 
including imputed corporate taxes and accrued profits in the analysis (below).      
 
––Table 14 here–– 
 
c) Low effective rates including imputed corporate tax and accrued profits 
Given the problem of undeclared distributed profits, we believe effective rates that include 
the corporate tax and accrued profits provide a better metric of the tax burden at the top in Chile.  
Table 15 displays average effective tax rates defined as all income taxes paid during the year 
divided by income accrued during the year (Y_AcrdProf).  Average effective rates for the top 
fractiles reach at most 17.2%.    
The average tax rates reported for the top percentiles again mask significant variation of 
rates within these groups.  This variation is due largely to the fact that total income tax liabilities 
for the year do not correspond directly to income definition Y_AcrdProf (profits accrued during the 
year in question, which may or may not be distributed); the individual income tax reflects 
distributed profits, while the corporate tax reflects accrued profits.  As such, taxpayers with large 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35This result may reflect an error in the data provided by the tax agency; it is possible that a tax return for a non-
Chilean national was accidentally included in this top group of eleven taxpayers.  
36Dividends in Colombia, as in Argentina and many other countries, are taxed only at the firm level.  
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distributed profits but few accrued profits (or significant losses) have very high effective tax 
rates calculated with income denominator Y_AcrdProf.  In addition to the distinct tax treatment of 
retained versus distributed profits, loss carry forward or carry back and use of other tax benefits 
contributes to horizontal inequities.  
For comparative context, Table 15 also displays average effective tax rates for the U.S. 
calculated by Piketty and Saez (2006), the only study of which we are aware that fully includes 
the corporate tax in analyzing top fractile tax incidence.  The Chilean rates are 40-64% of the 
U.S. rates.  When comparing the Chilean and US effective tax rates, it should be kept in mind 
that Piketty and Saez’s (2006) corporate tax incidence assumptions and imputation methods 
differ from ours.  They impute corporate taxes paid in proportion to individuals’ realized capital 
income, including dividends, capital gains, and interest, whereas we impute corporate taxes paid 
in proportion to ownership of accrued profits, which we judge more appropriate for Chile.37  It 
should also be noted that Piketty and Saez (2006) do not impute reinvested corporate profits in 
their analysis, since they maintain that realized capital gains on stocks in the U.S. are of 
comparable magnitude.  The Chilean context is very different, given that few companies are 
publicly traded, only 35% of profits are distributed annually according to tax return data, and 
total reported capital gains are less than 1% of accrued profits.   
 
––Table 15 here–– 
 
 
Conclusion 
Our highly detailed and disaggregated tax-return data provide the most accurate available 
estimates to date of top income shares, income compositions, unrealized capital income, and 
effective tax rates in Chile.  Chilean top income shares—whether profits are adjusted to national 
accounts or not—are among the highest of those countries that have so far been analyzed with 
similar methods.  Including accrued profits in the analysis skews the distribution even more 
heavily toward the top.  Effective tax rates, meanwhile, are modest.  Regarding policy 
implications, the evidence we present suggests that there is substantial room to raise revenue for 
social spending by taxing Chile’s upper income earners and capital owners more heavily, in line 
with the Bachelet administration’s efforts, although analysis of optimal tax policy and its role in 
public finance lies beyond the scope of this paper.38  We hope that our empirical data will inform 
ongoing debates on tax policy and inequality in Chile.  
We hope to extend our research during the coming years by building a time series, which 
would allow analysis of the determinants of top income shares and responses to tax policy 
changes since democratization. Such analysis could potentially yield different results from 
OECD findings (Roine et al. 2009, Piketty et al. 2014), given that Latin America is characterized 
by a distinct type of “hierarchical capitalism” that reinforces economic and political inequalities 
(Schneider 2013, Schneider and Soskice 2009). Access to more years of data, which the Chilean 
tax agency will hopefully provide as time and resources allow, will also afford more complete 
information on business ownership for imputing accrued profits.   
More broadly, our analysis highlights the need for greater attention in the top incomes 
literature to three research agendas.  First, more efforts to analyze the distribution of capital 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37We treat the portion of corporate tax corresponding to pension and insurance funds in a similar manner as Piketty 
and Saez (2006), imputing this amount in proportion to taxpayers’ wage and pension income.       
38E.g. Saez 2011, Piketty et al. 2014. Recent research suggests capital income could be taxed more heavily without 
substantial efficiency costs (Diamond and Saez 2011, Christiansen and Tuomala 2008, Saez 2013, Yagan 2014). 
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income—whether realized or not—could make a significant contribution to our understanding of 
inequality around the globe, although data constraints will likely remain problematic.  As the 
Chilean case illustrates, realized capital income may correlate only roughly with unrealized 
capital income at the top of the distribution.  Second, more analysis of how tax systems affect 
income definitions as well as how much and what type of income is actually declared across 
countries (and over time) is in order.  In Chile, the structure of the income tax creates a particular 
set of incentives that must be taken into account when endeavoring to estimate income shares 
and effective tax rates that are reasonably comparable with other countries.  Additional attention 
to comparability issues, cross-national systemization, and methodological standards for imputing 
undeclared income will become increasingly important as tax return data become available in 
more developing countries.  Third, the top incomes literature could fruitfully expand to include 
more analyses of effective tax rates paid by the rich and super-rich.  We are aware of only a 
handful of studies that undertake such analysis.  This line of inquiry could help shed light on the 
relationship between taxation and inequality at the top of the income distribution and could serve 
as a valuable input for policy debates on tax reform and analysis of redistributive politics.   
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Control Incomes, % GDP 
 
 2005 2009 
Y_Rlzd 50.7 50.1 
YRlzd_NatAcc 59.3 60.2 
Y_AcrdProf 54.8 53.6 
YAcrdProf_NatAcc 66.3 66.9 
Y´(´)_AcrdProf 57.7 56.4 
Y_Rlzd_CG 50.8 50.1 
Y_AcrdProf_CG 55.0 53.9 
Y_AcrdProf_Pen 50.6 49.6 
 
Notes: Y_Rlzd includes distributed profits. Y_Rlzd_NatAcc denotes that independent work and distributed profits 
are adjusted to National Accounts.  Y_AcrdProf includes accrued profits. Y_AcrdProf_NacAcc denotes that 
independent work and accrued profits are adjusted to National Accounts.  Y´_AcrdProf and Y´´_AcrdProf include 
imputed residual accrued profits with no ownership information.  CG denotes inclusion of capital gains.  For 
Y_AcrdProf_Pen, imputed accrued profits from pension funds replace pension payments. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Population and Tax Returns 
 
 Population over 20 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticos 
Tax returns 
Source: SII 
2005 10,750,033 6,808,535 
2009 11,582,966 7,731,605 
 
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticos for adult population; own datasets for tax returns. 
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Table 3: Realized Income Shares (with Distributed Profits), 2005 (2009) 
 
 Top 0.0001 Top 0.001 Top 0.01 Top 0.1 Top 1 Top 10 Top 20 
Y_Rlzd    0.091 (0.053) 0.335 (0.261) 1.090 (0.988) 4.020 (3.825) 15.54 (15.02) 49.30 (48.93) 63.79 (63.94) 
Y_Rlzd_CG   0.091 (0.052) 0.336 (0.299) 1.096 (1.034) 4.054 (3.886) 15.60 (15.10) 49.35 (48.98) 63.83 (63.98) 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc   0.211 (0.106) 0.628 (0.454) 1.817 (1.636) 6.145 (5.911) 21.75 (21.63) 55.41 (55.81) 68.46 (69.21) 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt1 0.974 (1.718) 2.901 (3.663) 6.155 (6.795) 11.97 (12.57) 24.39 (24.88) 55.28 (55.69) 68.24 (68.96) 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt2   0.902 (1.140) 3.051 (3.346) 7.006 (7.379) 13.18 (13.70) 25.86 (26.23) 56.17 (56.63) 68.80 (69.56) 
        
  
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets.  
Notes: These Chilean incomes include only distributed profits. NatAcc denotes that profits and independent work are 
adjusted to National Accounts. Alt1 denotes the alternative adjustment procedure for distributed profits using the difference 
between taxpayers’ positive accrued profits and distributed profits; Alt2 denotes the alternative adjustment procedure for 
distributed profits using the FUT distribution.  CG denotes inclusion of capital gains.   
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Table 4: Income Shares with Accrued Profits, 2005 (2009)  
 
 Top 0.0001% Top 0.001% Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% Top 20% 
Y_AcrdProf   0.8277 (1.353) 2.468 (2.895) 5.298 (5.458) 10.66 (10.60) 23.25 (23.04) 55.15 (55.23) 68.72 (69.35) 
Y´_AcrdProf 0.7997 (1.290) 2.387 (2.780) 5.216 (5.337) 10.86 (10.71) 24.34 (23.88) 56.58 (56.48) 69.78 (70.27) 
Y´´_AcrdProf 1.058 (1.755) 3.152 (3.750) 6.706 (7.005) 13.09 (13.18) 26.50 (26.44) 58.01 (58.30) 71.07 (71.92) 
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc  1.422 (2.425) 4.232 (5.176) 8.960 (9.617) 17.14 (17.72) 32.02 (32.55) 61.92 (62.60) 73.68 (74.71) 
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc_alt 1.583 (NA) 5.390 (NA) 10.91 (NA) 19.26 (NA) 32.96 (NA) 61.52 (NA) 73.12 (NA) 
Y_AcrdProf_CG 0.8543 (1.377) 2.497 (3.028) 5.372 (5.744) 10.82 (11.01) 23.44 (23.42) 55.27 (55.44) 68.79 (69.48) 
Y_AcrdProf_Pen 0.8959 (1.460) 2.671 (3.126) 5.734 (5.894) 11.54 (11.45) 25.03 (24.75) 57.32 (57.59) 70.13 (71.10) 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets. 
Notes: Y´ and Y´´ include imputed residual accrued profits with no ownership information. In the first case, the residual is imputed in proportion 
to declared distributed profits; in the second case, it is imputed in proportion to the distribution of accrued profits for which ownership 
information exists.  NatAcc denotes that accrued profits and independent work are adjusted to National Accounts.  Alt denotes the alternative 
adjustment procedure for accrued profits using gross income.  CG denotes inclusion of capital gains.  Pen indicates that imputed accrued profits 
from pension funds have replaced pension payments. 
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Table 5: Income Shares with Distributed Profits (Y_Rlzd) vs. Accrued Profits (Y_AcrdProf)  
by Different Rankings; 2005 (2009) 
 
a) Unadjusted Incomes 
 
 Top 0.0001  Top 0.001 Top 0.01 Top 0.1 Top 1 Top 10 
Y_Rlzd 0.091 (0.053) 0.335 (0.261) 1.090 (0.988) 4.020 (3.825) 15.54 (15.02) 49.3 (48.9) 
Y_AcrdProf ranked by Y_Rlzd 0.109 (0.159) 0.929 (0.430) 2.570 (1.561) 6.986 (5.071) 19.90 (17.50) 51.89 (50.33) 
Y_AcrdProf  0.828 (1.353) 2.468 (2.895) 5.298 (5.458) 10.66 (10.60) 23.25 (23.04) 55.15 (55.2) 
Ratio of Y_AcrdProf to Y_Rlzd  9.06 (25.77) 7.36 (11.10) 4.86 (5.52) 2.65 (2.77) 1.50 (1.53) 1.12 (1.13) 
 
b) Incomes adjusted to National Accounts 
 
 Top 0.0001 Top 0.001 Top 0.01 Top 0.1     xx Top 1 Top 10 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc  0.211 (0.106) 0.628 (0.454) 1.817 (1.636) 6.145 (5.911) 21.75 (21.63) 55.4 (55.8) 
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc ranked by Y_Rlzd_NatAcc 0.335 (0.315) 1.702 (0.911) 4.191 (2.983) 10.67 (8.667) 26.77 (24.40) 57.90 (56.47) 
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc 1.422 (2.425) 4.232 (5.176) 8.960 (9.617) 17.14 (17.72) 32.02 (32.55) 61.92 (62.60) 
Ratio of Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc to Y_Rlzd_NatAcc 6.74 (22.8) 6.74 (11.4) 4.93 (5.88) 2.79 (3.00) 1.47 (1.50) 1.12 (1.12) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from own datasets.  
Notes: Y_Rlzd includes only distributed profits. Y_Rlzd_NatAcc denotes that independent work and distributed profits are adjusted to National Accounts.  
Y_AcrdProf includes accrued profits. Y_AcrdProf_NacAcc denotes that independent work and accrued profits are adjusted to National Accounts.   
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Table 6: Transitions from Top Y_Rlzd Fractiles to Y_AcrdProf Fractiles (2005) 
 
Y_Rlzd fracile  % Also in Top Y_AcrdProf fractile 
Top 0.001% 19.4 
Top 0.01%  27.9  
Top 0.1% 45.2 
Top 1% 77.6 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets. 
Notes: Y_Rlzd includes only distributed profits.  Y_AcrdProf includes accrued profits.  
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Table 7: Top Income Shares Estimated from Published Tabulated Data  
 
a) With Distributed Profits: Y_Rlzd  (Y_Rlzd_NatAcc)  
 
 Top 0.01 Top 0.1 Top 1 
2004 1.10 (1.83) 4.18 (6.42) 16.3 (23.1) 
2005  1.10 (1.82) 4.06 (6.23) 15.5 (22.1) 
  microdata:  1.090 (1.817) 4.020 (6.145) 15.54 (21.75) 
2006 0.99 (1.65) 3.71 (5.71) 14.4 (20.5) 
2007 1.01 (1.67) 3.77 (5.80) 14.6 (20.7) 
2008 2.50 (4.15) 6.11 (9.39) 17.1 (24.3) 
2009  0.98 (1.63) 3.79 (5.83) 15.0 (21.3) 
microdata: 0.988 (1.636) 3.825 (5.911) 15.02 (21.63) 
2010  0.93 (1.54) 3.55 (5.45) 14.0 (19.9) 
2011 0.95 (1.57) 3.66 (5.63) 14.2 (20.1) 
2012 0.94 (1.56) 3.56 (5.47) 13.9 (19.7) 
 
b) With Accrued Profits: Y_AcrdProf  (Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc) 
  
 Top 0.01* Top 0.1 Top 1 
2004 5.7 (9.9) 11.3 (18.6) 24.7 (34.4) 
2005  5.7 (9.8) 11.0 (18.0) 23.5 (32.8) 
   microdata: 5.298 (8.960) 10.66 (17.14) 23.25 (32.02) 
2006  5.2 (8.9) 10.1 (16.5) 21.9 (30.5) 
2007 5.2 (9.0) 10.2 (16.7) 22.1 (30.8) 
2008 13 (22) 16.6 (27.1) 25.9 (36.2) 
2009  5.1 (8.8) 10.3 (16.9) 22.8 (31.8) 
 microdata: 5.298 (9.617) 10.60 (17.72) 23.04 (32.55) 
2010 4.8 (8.3) 9.62 (15.8) 21.2 (29.6) 
2011 4.9 (8.5) 9.93 (16.3) 21.5 (29.9) 
2012 4.9 (8.4) 9.64 (15.8) 21.0 (29.3) 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using adjustment factors (geometric mean) from Table 8 and 
www.sii.cl/estadisticas/contribuyentes/impuestos_personales.htm 
Notes: Y_Rlzd includes only distributed profits.  Y_AcrdProf includes accrued profits. NatAcc denotes that profits 
and independent work are adjusted to National Accounts.  *These estimates likely have more error compared to the 
lower fractiles (see Table 8.b). 
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Table 8:  Adjustment Factors  
Ratios of top income share estimates from microdata to estimates from tabulated data 
 
a) Y_Rlzd  (Y_Rlzd_NatAcc)  
 
 Top 0.01 Top 0.1 Top 1 
2005 1.045 (1.742) 1.016 (1.554) 1.010 (1.414) 
2009 1.058 (1.752) 1.034 (1.598) 1.009 (1.453) 
Geometric mean 1.051 (1.747) 1.025 (1.576) 1.010 (1.433) 
Relative difference (%)1 1.24 (0.57) 1.75 (2.84) -0.14 (2.71) 
 
b) Y_AcrdProf  (Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc) 
 
 Top 0.01 Top 0.1 Top 1 
2005 5.079 (8.589) 2.695 (4.334) 1.511 (2.082) 
2009 5.844 (10.30) 2.867 (4.792) 1.547 (2.186) 
Geometric mean 5.448 (9.405) 2.780 (4.557) 1.529 (2.133) 
Relative difference (%)1 14.05 (18.2) 6.16 (10.1) 2.35 (4.90) 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets and 
www.sii.cl/estadisticas/contribuyentes/impuestos_personales.htm 
Notes: NatAcc denotes that profits and independent work are adjusted to National Accounts. 
1Relative difference = (2009 factor – 2005 factor)/(geometric mean) 
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Table 9: Mobility in Chile and Germany 
Percent remaining in top fractile (Chile: after 4 years; Germany: after 3 years) 
 
 Chile, Y_Rlzd 
 
Germany1 
Unconditional on  
fractile membership 
after 3 years Conditional Unconditional 
Top 0.001% 32.4 30.6 ~50 
Top 0.01% 45.5 42.2 ~50 
Top 0.1% 50.2 47.1 ~56-59 
Top 1% 64.4 60.3 ~67 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets; 1Jenderny 2013: 13.  
Notes: German fractiles based on individuals aged 20-65 only, 2002-03. Y_Rlzd includes only distributed profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Mobility Among Top Fractiles in Chile (2005) 
Percent remaining in respective top fractile after 4 years (conditional) 
  
 Y_Rlzd Y_AcrdProf 
Top 0.001% 32.4 40.2 
Top 0.01% 45.5 36.8 
Top 0.1% 50.2 45.2 
Top 1% 64.4 60.5 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets. 
Notes:  Y_Rlzd includes only distributed profits. Y_AcrdProf includes accrued profits.  
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Table 11: Shares (%) of Total Retained Profits (FUT), 2005 (2009) 
 
  Top 0.0001% Top 0.001% Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% 
T
ax
pa
ye
r 
R
an
ki
ng
 Y_Rlzd 1.301 (4.136) 8.965 (6.251) 20.40 (17.16) 41.40 (36.10) 75.52 (69.24) 95.25 (93.30) 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc 3.168 (4.648) 9.813 (8.331) 21.86 (20.44) 46.29 (42.45) 81.73 (78.11) 96.48 (95.25) 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt2  6.525 (7.725) 21.76 (22.61) 48.36 (47.98) 78.31 (77.68) 95.09 (94.68) 99.40 (99.42) 
Y_AcrdProf 5.319 (5.457) 18.53 (17.62) 40.42 (35.07) 65.11 (57.04) 82.10 (73.32) 89.41 (81.32) 
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc 5.319 (5.457) 18.49 (17.64) 40.58 (35.28) 66.79 (58.87) 84.21 (75.97) 89.91 (81.95) 
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc_alt 5.867 (NA) 19.32 (NA) 43.56 (NA) 71.80 (NA) 90.04 (NA) 95.35 (NA) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from own datasets. 
Notes: Y_Rlzd includes only distributed profits. Y_Rlzd_NatAcc denotes that independent work and distributed profits are 
adjusted to National Accounts; unreported profits are imputed in proportion to declared profits. Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt2 denotes 
the alternative adjustment procedure for distributed profits using the FUT distribution.  Y_AcrdProf includes accrued profits. 
Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc denotes that independent work and accrued profits are adjusted to National Accounts; unreported 
profits are imputed in proportion to declared profits. Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc_alt denotes the alternative adjustment procedure 
for accrued profits using gross income.   
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Table 12: Percent of Typical Taxpayers by Share of Income Type, 2005 (2009) 
Unadjusted reported income 
 
a) Top 1% 
 
 Y_Rlzd  Y_AcrdProf 
 Wages & 
Pensions 
Independent 
Work 
Distributed 
Profits 
 Wages & 
Pensions 
Independent 
Work 
Accrued 
Profits 
90-100% 1.0 (2.6) 0 (0) 0 (0.01)  0.6 (1.6) 0 (0) 1.3 (1.1) 
80-90% 7.8 (13.0) 0 (0) 0 (0)  4.3 (8.3) 0 (0) 1.9 (1.9) 
70-80% 21.2 (27.8) 0 (0) 0.1 (0.04)  14.0 (18.6) 0 (0) 3.1 (2.9) 
60-70% 30.1 (30.2) 0 (0) 0.4 (0.09)  23.3 (23.7) 0 (0) 4.8 (4.6) 
50-60% 24.4 (18 .4) 0 (0) 2.4 (1.3)  23.9 (20.3) 0 (0) 8.6 (7.8) 
40-50% 11.4 (6.4) 0.1 (0.03) 9.0 (6.0)  16.2 (12.8) 0.1 (0.03) 14.3 (12.9) 
30-40% 3.3 (1.2) 1.6 (0.56) 22.9 (18.9)  8.9 (7.2) 1.0 (0.28) 21.5 (19.3) 
20-30% 0.7 (0.3) 19.8 (5.7) 31.3 (32.0)  4.6 (3.8) 7.9 (4.2) 24.0 (23.2) 
10-20% 0.1 (0) 26.6 (29.4) 24.8 (28.9)  2.3 (2.4) 30.2  (24.1) 15.5 (17.5) 
0-10% 0.0 (0) 51.9 (64.3) 9.2 (12.8)  2.0 (1.5) 60.8 (71.4) 4.9 (8.9) 
 
 
b) Top 0.01% 
  
 Y_Rlzd  Y_Acrd_Prof 
 Wages & 
Pensions 
Independent 
Work 
Distributed 
Profits 
 Wages & 
Pensions 
Independent 
Work 
Accrued 
Profits 
90-100% 0 (1.9) 0 (0) 0 (0)  0 (0) 0 (0) 66.3 (61.0) 
80-90% 3.1 (3.8) 0 (0) 1.0 (0)  0 (0) 0 (0) 31.6 (28.6) 
70-80% 9.2 (14.3)  0 (0) 1.0 (0)  0 (0) 0 (0) 1.0 (10.5) 
60-70% 19.4 (30.5) 0 (0) 1.0 (0)  0 (0) 0 (0) 1.0 (0) 
50-60% 18.4 (21.0) 1.0 (0) 10.2 (7.6)  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
40-50% 24.5 (19.0) 0 (1.0) 14.3 (13.3)  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
30-40% 15.3 (7.6) 6.1 (2.9) 28.6 (19.0)  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
20-30% 8.2 (1.9) 19.4 (6.7) 25.5 (31.4)  1.0 (2.9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
10-20% 1.0 (0) 35.7 (34.3) 14.3 (23.8)  15.3 (25.7) 6.1 (3.8) 0 (0) 
0-10% 1.0 (0) 37.8 (55.2) 4.1 (4.8)  83.7 (71.4) 93.9 (96.2) 0 (0) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from own datasets. 
Notes: Rows of 11 aggregated taxpayers are ranked by their share of each income type. Values in 
each column sum to 100 (%), with the exception of Accrued Profits for the top 1% in 2005: the 
residual 0.2% of these taxpayers have negative accrued profits.   Y_Rlzd includes only distributed 
profits.  Y_AcrdProf includes accrued profits.  
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Table 13: Chile’s Individual Income Tax Rate Structure, 2005 (2009) 
 
Threshold (UTA)* Marginal Rate (%) Percent of Taxpayers Percentile of Adult Population 
0-13.5 0 84.1 (81.7)  
13.5-30 5 10.5 (12.0) Top 10.4  (12.5) 
30-50 10 2.9 (3.3) Top 3.56  (4.30) 
50-70 15 1.2 (1.4) Top 1.64  (2.06) 
70-90 25 0.6 (0.7) Top 0.87  (1.13) 
90-120 32 0.4 (0.5) Top 0.49  (0.64) 
120-150 37 0.2 (0.2) Top 0.23  (0.29) 
150 and above 40 0.2 (0.2) Top 0.13  (0.16) 
  
Source: SII and authors’ calculations.    
Note: Chile’s tax system is fully inflation-adjusted.  *One UTA equaled 378,852 pesos (USD 674) in 2005 
and 442,356 pesos (USD 804) in 2009. 
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Table 14: Average Effective Tax Rates (%), Excluding Corporate Tax on Retained Profits   
a) Chilean Rates with no adjustments for undeclared income 
 
 Chilea Colombiab Uruguayc U.S.d Germanye 
2005 2009 2006 2009 2009 2004 2005 
Top 0.0001% 15.43 30.95 NA NA NA NA 28.7 
Top 0.001% 27.21 30.14 7.3 4.8 NA NA 31.0 
Top 0.01% 29.14 28.28 8.3 7.1 NA 25.6 32.9 
Top 0.1% 25.31 25.12 8.7 7.7 14.4 24.8 33.7 
Top 1% 15.41 16.40 7.5 7.1 15.9 20.8 30.5 
P 99.99-100 29.14 28.28 8.3 7.1 NA 26.2 NA 
P 99.9-99.99% 23.89 24.03 NA NA NA 25.1 NA 
P 99.5-99.9% 14.62 16.05 7.7 7.6 NA 23.8 NA 
P 99-99.5% 8.73 10.30 5.6 5.7 NA 21.4 NA 
Sources and Notes: aAuthors’ calculations from own datasets using income denominator Y_Rlzd (includes only 
distributed profits); bAlvaredo & Londoño 2013: individual income tax including corporate tax on dividends; 
cBurdín et al. 2014; dPiketty & Saez 2006: individual income tax only, taxpayers ranked excluding capital gains; 
eBach et al. 2012. 
 
b) Chilean rates adjusted for undeclared income 
 
 Income denominator 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc  Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt1  Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt2 
2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 
Top 0.0001% 15.35 14.93 15.92 8.34 8.89 8.71 
Top 0.001% 19.37 15.71 15.85 8.59 8.49 8.69 
Top 0.01% 20.24 15.38 16.27 9.23 10.16 9.13 
Top 0.1% 19.07 14.47 17.27 11.03 11.73 10.69 
Top 1% 15.35 12.15 15.47 12.04 12.10 11.85 
P 99.99-100 20.24 15.38 16.27 9.23 10.16 9.13 
P 99.9-99.99% 18.59 14.11 18.31 13.15 13.79 12.52 
P 99.5-99.9% 15.08 11.72 16.08 14.63 14.07 14.72 
P 99-99.5% 12.23 10.69  10.27 10.81 10.21 10.80 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from own datasets.    
Note: Numerator includes imputed corporate tax on undeclared dividends, approximated by applying the global 
average withholding rate for the year.  This approach likely overestimates the amount of tax actually paid. 
Y_Rlzd_NatAcc adjusts independent work and distributed profits to National Accounts; undeclared distributed 
profits are imputed in proportion to declared distributed profits. Alt1 denotes the alternative adjustment procedure 
for distributed profits using the difference between taxpayers’ positive accrued profits and distributed profits; alt2 
denotes the alternative adjustment procedure for distributed profits using the FUT distribution.   
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Table 15:  Effective Tax Rates (%), Including Corporate Tax on Retained Profits 
 
  Chile  U.S. 
2005  2009 2004 
Top 0.0001% 15.66 13.92  NA 
Top 0.001% 15.22 14.17  NA 
Top 0.01% 15.96 15.13  31.2  
Top 0.1% 17.20 16.54  29.2 
Top 1% 15.15 15.47  24.3 
P 99.99-100 15.96  15.13  30.8 
P 99.9-99.99% 18.43  18.03  30.0 
P 99.5-99.9% 15.90  16.73  28.1 
P 99-99.5% 9.91  11.53  25.1 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets; Piketty & Saez 2006 for the U.S.    
Note: Chilean rates calculated with income denominator Y_AcrdProf (reported incomes with accrued profits). 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Lorenz Curves, 2005 Realized Income    
  
a) Top 10% 
 
 
 
b) Top 1% 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from own datasets. 
Note: Y_Rlzd (green), Y_Rlzd_NatAcc (red), Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt1 (blue), Y_Rlzd_NatAcc_alt2 (purple). Incomes 
with only distributed profits.  NatAcc denotes that profits and independent work are adjusted to National Accounts. 
Alt1 denotes the alternative adjustment procedure for distributed profits using the difference between taxpayers’ 
positive accrued profits and distributed profits; alt2 denotes the alternative adjustment procedure for distributed 
profits using the FUT distribution. 
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Figure 2: Lorenz Curves, 2005 Income with Accrued Profits  
  
a) Top 10%         b) Top 1% 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from own datasets. 
Note: Y_AcrdProf (green), Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc (red), Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc_alt (purple).  Incomes with accrued 
profits.  NatAcc denotes that profits and independent work are adjusted to National Accounts. Alt denotes the 
alternative adjustment procedure for accrued profits using gross income.   
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Figure 3: Standard Realized Income Shares (%), Excluding Capital Gains. 
 
a) Top 1%  
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b) Top 0.01%   
 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets and published tabulated data (Chile); World Top Incomes 
Database; Alvaredo 2007 (evasion-adjusted Argentine shares). 
Notes: The standard realized income definition includes only distributed profits. For the Chilean estimates, NatAcc 
denotes that profits and independent work are adjusted to National Accounts. Alt1 denotes the alternative adjustment 
procedure for distributed profits using the difference between taxpayers’ positive accrued profits and distributed 
profits; alt2 denotes the alternative adjustment procedure for distributed profits using the FUT distribution.  Tab 
denotes estimates from published tabulated data (Section II part c).  The 2008 values for estimates from the 
tabulated data are outliers that likely reflect an error in the published data. 
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Figure 4: Income Shares (%), Including Accrued Profits (Chile) or Capital Gains 
 
 a) Top 1% 
 
 
 
  
5"
10"
15"
20"
25"
30"
35"
40"
2003" 2004" 2005" 2006" 2007" 2008" 2009" 2010" 2011" 2012"
Chile"Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc_alt"
Chile"Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc"
Chile"Y_AcrdProf_NatAcc_tab"
Chile"Y´´_AcrdProf"
Chile"Y´_AcrdProf"
Chile"Y_AcrdProf"
Chile"Y_AcrdProf_tab"
United"States"
Germany"
Japan"
Spain"
Sweden"
	   36 
 b) Top 0.01% 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from own datasets and published tabulated data (Chile); World Top Incomes 
Database. 
Notes: Y´ and Y´´ include imputed residual accrued profits with no ownership information. In the first case, the 
residual is imputed in proportion to declared distributed profits; in the second case, it is imputed in proportion to the 
distribution of accrued profits for which ownership information exists.  NatAcc denotes that accrued profits and 
independent work are adjusted to National Accounts.  Alt denotes the alternative adjustment procedure for accrued 
profits using gross income.  Tab denotes estimates from published tabulated data (Section II part c).  The 2008 
values for estimates from the tabulated data are outliers that likely reflect an error in the published data; they are not 
displayed in the Top 0.01% chart because the derivation procedure amplifies their extremity (see Tables 7 and 8). 
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Figure 5: Top Income Compositions, % of Total 
See separate file
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Appendix 1:  Income Categories 
 
Interest earnings  
This category includes inflation-adjusted earnings from deposits in financial institutions, as 
well as capital gains from mutual and investment funds, capital gains classified as habitual (e.g. 
stocks bought and sold within one year), and interest earned on voluntary pension savings (above 
the legally required minimum contributions).  Only real interest earnings are taxable in Chile.     
 
Capital gains  
Non-habitual capital gains are classified under the separate capital gains category.  As with 
interest earnings, reported capital gains are non-negative.  Chile taxes only specific types of non-
habitual capital gains.  Capital gains from selling real estate and stocks in publicly-traded 
corporations are tax exempt and hence are not reported to the tax agency.  Capital gains received 
by businesses, which account for the majority of declared capital gains in Chile, were imputed to 
individual taxpayers following the same procedure used to impute accrued profits (below).  Like 
capital gains, most forms of rental income are tax-exempt. 
 
Accrued profits 
Accrued profits were estimated by adding losses accumulated from previous years to 
declared taxable profits (Chile allows unlimited loss carry-forward).  Allowances for accelerated 
depreciation should also be added to taxable profits; however, tax returns do not contain 
sufficient information to make this correction.   
Ownership shares for imputing accrued profits were calculated from business tax forms as 
the ratio of profits distributed to a particular owner to total profits distributed by the firm during 
the year in question.  We obtained information to calculate ownership shares for the years 2003, 
2005, 2007, and 2009.  For firms that distributed profits during only one of these four years, we 
assume that ownership did not change significantly over time.  This situation arose only for 
partnerships, which change ownership less frequently than corporations.    
Accrued profits were allocated in proportion to these ownership shares.  Multiple iterations 
were necessary to trace interlocking business ownership down to the level of individual 
taxpayers.  Through this procedure, 49% (45%) of the total accrued profits for 2005 (2009) were 
imputed to Chilean taxpayers, 31% (37%) to foreign owners, and 3% (2%) to funds managed by 
pension and mutual administrators.  
We lack ownership information for a sizable number of businesses that did not report any 
distributed profits during any of the years for which we obtained information—not only 2005 
and 2009, but also 2003 and 2007, for which the tax agency agreed to provide us with the 
specific data needed to calculate ownership shares.1  Profits accrued to these firms constituted 
approximately 17% (16%) of total profits reported to the tax agency in 2005 (2009).  We employ 
three alternatives to handle these residual profits:  1) omission; 2) imputation based on the 
distribution of accrued profits for which we do have ownership information; 3) imputation in 
proportion to the distribution of taxpayers’ declared distributed profits.  All of these approaches 
are ad hoc, but they provide a rough estimate of the uncertainty surrounding the distribution of 
accrued profits.  All three approaches assume that the information we have fully identifies 
members of the Chilean business class.  It should be noted that we impute accrued net losses in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Data from these two additional years allowed us to reduce profits with no ownership information by roughly 40%.   
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the same manner as accrued net profits; as such, our datasets contain rows with large negative 
entries in this income category.         
Accrued profits in pension funds were imputed in proportion to taxpayers’ pension and 
wage income.  (Independent workers were not required to contribute to pension funds, and their 
voluntary savings in pension funds tended to be small.)  This procedure is highly approximate, 
given that we lack information on taxpayers’ accumulated pension contributions that would be 
needed to calculate ownership shares for members of any given pension plan administrator 
(AFP).  However, our procedure captures the general idea that this form of capital income 
accrues to labor rather than business owners.  Because profits accrued in these funds are 
comparatively small, they do not have a significant effect on top income shares.   
 
 
Appendix 2:  Adjusting for Undeclared Income 
 
Independent Work 
To adjust independent work income in our datasets, we first use Chilean household surveys 
(CASEN) to estimate the portion of the national accounts figure that accrues to individuals who 
did not file tax returns.  We assume that non-filers did not earn enough to owe income taxes.  
While some non-filers may be tax evaders, we believe it is highly unlikely that the tax agency 
lacks records on any independent workers who belong to the ranks of Chile’s top income earners.  
The amount of independent work income calculated from CASEN that corresponds to the same 
number of individuals who file tax returns exceeds the tax agency figure.  We impute the 
difference to taxpayers in proportion to their declared independent work income.  The estimated 
evasion rate for this income type is 16.0% (30.6%) in 2005 (2009). 
For this procedure, we rank the household survey data by independent work income.  If we 
rank the survey data by total income instead and match to tax-filers on that basis, the adjustment 
amount changes only marginally.    
 
Distributed Profits 
a) Imputing undeclared profits in proportion to declared distributed profits 
This procedure does not alter the distribution of distributed profits.  We assume a uniform 
evasion rate of 64.6% (68.4%) in 2005 (2009) based on the discrepancy between national 
accounts and tax agency totals.   
Ideally, profits distributed directly to individual taxpayers by publicly-traded corporations 
should first be subtracted from declared dividends.  These dividends are not subject to under-
declaration, because the tax agency checks amounts reported by shareholders against records 
provided by these corporations.  However, the vast majority (at least 90%) of shareholders in 
publicly-traded companies are businesses, not individuals; only 3-7% of dividends are distributed 
directly to individuals.  The potential for bias in our adjustment procedure associated with 
inflating dividends received by taxpayers who own direct shares in publicly-traded corporations 
is thereby minimal.  Moreover, we lack information to distinguish dividends emitted by publicly-
traded companies from profits distributed by other firms.  The owners of privately-held 
businesses that receive dividends from publicly-traded corporations may in turn access those 
dividends without declaring distributed profits to the tax agency.  In fact, the low prevalence of 
direct individual ownership in publicly-traded companies likely reflects the avoidance and 
evasion incentives created by the income tax system. 
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b) Imputing in proportion to the difference between accrued and declared distributed profits 
This approach entails allocating undeclared distributed profits estimated from national 
accounts to taxpayers in our unadjusted datasets who have positive differences between their 
accrued profits and their distributed profits.  The assumption is that taxpayers with large accrued 
profits who declare very few distributed profits are engaged in evasion.  This approach captures 
the inherent incentives that the tax system creates for underdeclaring dividends, yet it of course 
fails to distinguish taxpayers who actually do reinvest their profits in the firm from those who do 
so only on paper.   
Taxpayers with net losses (instead of positive accrued profits) receive no imputed 
undeclared distributed profits.  Likewise, taxpayers whose declared distributed profits exceed 
their accrued profits receive no imputed undeclared distributed profits.  Among the population of 
taxpayers with positive accrued profits whose declared distributed profits are of a smaller value, 
we allocate undeclared distributed profits in proportion to the distribution of total net positive 
differences between accrued and distributed profits in the unadjusted datasets. 
In contrast to adjustment method (a), method (b) alters the distribution of distributed profits 
substantially.  Because the value of imputed undeclared profits is so large, the adjusted 
distribution is similar to the distribution of positive accrued profits.  
 
b) Imputing in proportion to retained profits accumulated in the FUT 
In this scenario, taxpayers are assumed to underdeclare distributed profits in proportion to 
the amount of retained profits accumulated in their FUT accounts, in accord with the view that 
the FUT serves largely as a mechanism for tax evasion.  This procedure also significantly alters 
the distribution of distributed profits.   
 
Accrued Profits 
The national accounts figure was obtained starting from the gross operating surplus, 
subtracting fixed capital consumption (depreciation), subtracting imputed home-owner rent and 
mixed income, adding net interest, royalties, and rent payments, and finally subtracting the state-
owned copper company’s operating surplus.  For 2009, due to changes in national accounts 
formatting, we must also subtract mixed income (independent work and sole proprietorship).  To 
this figure, we add back sole proprietorship income from tax agency figures; this amount cannot 
be distinguished from independent work in the national accounts figures. 
We attribute the full difference between the national accounts and tax agency figures to 
domestic businesses only.  The rationale is that mining companies account for the majority of 
foreign-owned profits (roughly 95%), and national accounts figures obtain data on this sector’s 
profits directly from these companies’ public balance sheets.  Any evasion that these foreign 
companies might engage in therefore is not captured in the national accounts figure.  Applying 
this adjustment procedure yields accrued domestic profits of 23% GDP for 2005 and 24% GDP 
for 2009. 
 
a) Imputing undeclared accrued profits in proportion to net positive declared accrued profits  
We impute the difference between the national accounts and tax agency figures only to 
taxpayers in our unadjusted database with net positive accrued profits.  Taxpayers with net losses 
receive no adjustment, for lack of any information that could be used to discern a reasonable 
distribution.  We then assume that the distribution of the accrued profits we must impute from 
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national accounts follows the distribution of the positive accrued profits in our unadjusted 
datasets.  This procedure likely overestimates accrued profits at the top of the distribution.   
 
b) Imputing undeclared accrued profits in proportion to gross earnings  
We also employ an alternative approach that uses businesses’ gross earnings as the basis 
for adjustment.  This option has the advantage that accrued net losses as well as net profits 
receive a positive adjustment.  This positive adjustment for net losses is desirable given that our 
estimates of accrued profits do not correct for tax benefits associated with depreciation, which 
may account for some of the large negative values in our datasets.  Data on gross earnings comes 
directly from business tax returns; gross earnings were imputed to individual taxpayers using the 
same method employed for accrued profits.  	  
Other Income Sources   
We make no adjustments to wage income or pensions reported to the tax agency.  
Employers withhold taxes on wages, so it is unlikely that tax agency data suffers from under-
reporting.  It is possible that some individuals with taxable wage-incomes are absent from the tax 
agency’s records because they work for employers operating in the informal sector, but we think 
it is reasonable to assume that the informal sector by and large does not include individuals who 
fall within the ranks of the top 10%.  Wage income from national accounts for 2005 (2009) 
exceeded the tax agency figure by 31% (27%); we allocate this amount entirely to the bottom of 
the income distribution.  In the case of pensions, tax agency information comes directly from the 
pension fund administrators, so these data should not be affected by under-declaration either.      
We do not adjust reported capital gains, rent, or interest earnings in our datasets for lack of 
information on the total amounts of income in these categories beyond what is available in tax 
agency records.  It should be noted that rental income and capital gains may suffer from 
substantial under-reporting, since the tax agency does not receive information on these income 
sources from parties other than the taxpayers themselves.   
